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Chapter I
Theoretical Rationale
Within the massive 1 iterature on attitude change can be found studies

that distinguish between the informative and emotion-arousing functions of
credible communications (Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield, 1949; Hovland,
Janis and Kelley, 1953; Katz and Lazarsfe-ld, 1955).

Few, however, exp! icate

the singular role of information and modes of presenting information in motivating individuals to act.

The notable exceptions are Fitzsimmons and Os-

burn 1 s study of the impact of television news documentaries on the knowledge,
attitudes, and behavior of the viewer (1968), and Cook, Burd and Talbert's
examination of the cognitive, behavioral, and temporal effects of confronting
an experimentally formed belief with action implications of varying saliency
(1970).

Within the framework of these studies, the present research poses

this question:

Does a formal communication (lecture) alone and in conjunc-

tion with face-to-face informal discussion ( 11 personal influence 11 ) predispose
an

indivi~ual

to participate in an activity based upon information learned

in the two situations? .
The paramount influence of personal contact has been demonstrated in
both laboratory and field settings.

From the classic voting surveys of Erie

County (Lazarsfeld,Berelson and Gaudet, 1948) and Elmira (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and McPhee, 1954) emerge panel data 1 and the notion that one 1 s intimates--

-

1The panel technique •involves
'
the repeated interviewing

sample.

0 1f

a smal 1

Here the development of preferences for candidates during the

course of a political campaign was traced.
-1-
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family, friends, and co-workers--would have much influence on how one thinks,
feels, and acts

vis-~-vis

specific issues.

The role of people in mediating

the flow of ma~s media in contemporary society (Katz, 1957) becomes even more

I pronounced

in a small group (laboratory) situation.

I with each other

Individuals interacting

relative to a particular problem which concerns all will

develop a collective approach to that problem.

They eventually create an

opinion, an attitude, a decision, or an action which they embrace-in common
(Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955:57).
The hypothesis that an individual will more readily respond to an influence attempt if he perceives that others support him in.a proposed change
underlies the "group decisiqn" experiments pioneered by Lewin (1947).

His

work describes the effectiveness of group discussion (followed by "group
dee is ion") for achieving change.

Where the group is the "medium" of change,

pressure for a particular action to be taken by members of the group
individuals originates within the group (Cartwright, 1951).

~

This pressure

exerted by "others" in a milieu that fosters verbal exchange constitutes the
group salience and situational cues which elicit the desired behavior (Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953:161-165).

Pelz, in replicating Lewin's basic

design, however, found that group discussion per se and pub! ic commitment
were not the foremost mechanisms of influence.

Rather, the whole process

of making a decision and the individual 1 sperception of group consensus generated behavioral differences comparable to those obtained by Lewin and his
associates.

This finding prompt~d Pelz to redefine "group decision" as "de-

cision about individual goals in a setting of shared norms regarding such
goals" (1958:440-444).
-2-
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Thus, while social scientists acknowledge the contradictory findings of
studies conducted under lab as opposed to field conditions (Hovland, 1959;
Riley and Riley, 1959; Blumer, 1959:205-206; Pool, 1959:239-240), most agree

that interpersonal communication (i.e., personal influence) i1_ a variable of
sociological significance (Merton, 1949; Riley and Riley, 1951; Katz and
Lazarsfeld, 1955; Menzel and Katz, 1955; Rossi, 1959; Becker, 1970).
By focusing on the dispensation of information regarding-drug use in
the U.S., drug terminology, and facts about addicts, emphasis wi 11 be on
what learning takes place as a result of exposure to different (imposed)
social milieux (Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield, 1949; McGuire, 1968;
Fitzsimmons and Osburn, .1968).

Learning will then be measured with respect

to the subject's (S) willingness to behave in a manner ·consistent with the
information gained.

Rather than dwel 1 ing on the S's evaluation ("affective"

component of attitude) of a social issue, this study wi l I concentrate on
making the S aware of facts ("cognitive") and on predicting who will act
("conative") on the basis of ·those facts, given the opportunity to do so
(Thurs tone, 1929; Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953; Krech, Crutchfield and
Bal Jachey, 1962; DeFJeur and Westie, 1963; Secord and Backman, 1964; Brown,

1965; Cook, Burd, and Talbert, 1970).
Cartwright's outline of some principles of persuasion suggests the cumulative nature of an "affective-cognitive-conative" attitude paradigm.

This

paradigm presupposes the creation of cognitive, motivational, and behavioral
(action) structures in a groJp context (1949).
tially

Changes in behavior are ini-

dependent upon changes in one's cognitive structure (Schramm, 1948:

183-184; Merton, 1957:519).

but any further effort to influence a person's

..• must attempt either to modify needs (and goals) or to change
the person's motivational structure as to which activities lead
to which goals.

This means that a person can be induced to do

voluntarily something that he would otherwise not do only if a
need can be established for which this action is a goal or if
the action can be made to be seen as a path to an existing goal
(Cartwright, 1949: 302).
Hence, this approach to the communication (persuasion) process encompasses.
both the reception of messages (i.e., acquisition of knowledge) and its
implications for

potenti~l

behavior.

Inasmuch as the principles are valid,

Cartwright asserts,
... they should apply to all inductions (of behavior) whether
through the mass media or in a face-to-face situation.

They

should also apply to inductions attempted for all types of purposes, whether to sell, to train, to supervise work, to produce
therapy, and so on (1949:306).

'

Chapter II
Research Design
The generalizability of Cartwright's formulation to the realm of small
group research highlights the theoretical rationale offered in the preceding
chapter.

By postulating the existence of internal structures which determine

whether attitudinal and behavioral changes occur, the present researcher betrays a socio-psychological bent.

And th·e method of inducing certain behavior

constitutes his research design.

From the following design, therefore, change

in the Ss' knowledge, motivation, and inclination to act can be systematically
observed.

Also from the ensuing empirical data, one can make inferences about

the operation of the unmeasurable structures.
The design is

patterne~

after the Lewin and the Pelz comparisons of the

lecture and the group discussion--which is more effective for bringing about
change in an individual's attitude and subsequent behavior?

The study, how-

ever, is premised upon two questions raised by Fitzsimmons and Osburn:
I.

What learning takes place (in each stimulus situation)?
t:ere the basic concern is whether or not people absorb and
retain information about social issues.

2.

To what extent do these (stimulus situations) affect a person's potential to behave in a manner consistent with his
information (e.g., to learn more, to vote for change, and to
form groups)?

(1968:380).

Specifically, is a participatory

~nstead

of a passive information-getting situ

ation more conducive to creating a norm or exposing a latent norm for acting
to alleviate some social problem (in this case, drug abuse)?
relevant research finding, Katz and Lazarsfeld reply,

To reiterate a

1··---""w-~·---
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Apparently, something about interacting with others relative·

I

to a proposed change, compared with the isolation of the individual in both lectures and private instruction, produces a
marked behavioral change {1955:76).

That "something" embedded in the way individuals relate to each other even
in an ephemeral group (which is experimentally constructed) contributes to the
salience of the situation.

The pursuit of this issue--whether.group salience

or non-involvement in an informal discussion group is the source of variation
in the Ss 1 manifestations of knowledge and motivation to act on that knowledge--delimits the scope of the study.
·subjects were 108 students enrolled in compulsory introductory sociology
and psychology courses at the Niles College (seminary) branch of Loyola University and in an undergraduate statistics class at Loyola.

Each S was ad-

ministered a pre-communication information exam (thirty multiple choice and
true-false questions) on drug terms and drug facts.

Incorporated into this

instrument was a series of personal history questions {age, year in school,
etc.) and a question tapping the s•s predilection for volunteer work in general:

11

Please list the campus activities {campus dubs and organizations) in

which you pa rt i c i pate. 11

The purpose of this inquiry is to gauge the amount

of extra-curricular (voluntary) activity engaged in by the sample under scrutiny.
posed:

Another question geared to the test material--the subject of drugs--was
11

Would you be interested in participating in a volunteer program for

helping drug abusers?"

The

~sponse

(Fitzsimmons and Osburn, 1968:382).

denotes

11

simple awareness of the problem"

Ss affiliated with two or more voluntary

campus groups, including Apostolates for Niles students, and who affirm a

-6-

willingness to serve in a hypothetical activity related to drug abuse, comprisj
the "hi interest" group; the remainder of Ss are considered the "lo interest"
group.

The separate data collected on actual voluntary behavior and the en-

dorsement of a volunteer project to allay the drug problem enables precise
initial analysis of a variable monitored throughout the research.
Seven days after the pre-communication exam, Niles Ss were randomly assigned to an experiemental (E) or a le~ture only (L) condition~

Each group

heard a formal lecture on drugs delivered by a sociologist specializing in
addiction research.

To establish credibility, he was introduced as such.

An individual's tendency to accept a conclusion advocated by a
given communicator will depend in part upon how well informed and
intelligent he believes the communicator to be .....It seems neeessary, therefore, to make a distinction between l) the extent
to which a communicator is perceived to be a source of val id
assertions (his 'expertness') and 2) the degree of confidence in
the communicator's intent to communicate the assertions he considers most valid (his 'trustworthiness').

In any given case,

the weight given a communicator's assertions by· his audience will
depend upon both of these factors, and this resultant value can
be referred' to as the 'credibility' of the communicator (Hovland,
Janis and Kelley, 1953:21).
During the question-and-answer period following the address in the L situation, the lecturer

dogmaticall~

the text of his paper.

answered questions without departing from

This procedure was intended to maximize the Ss'

trust in the communicator since he was perceived as intending not to per-

-7-
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1·.:ade, but ju•t to info•m the audlenoe (Ho•i1nd, J1nlo ind

~lley, 1953•23).

Loyola (i.e., control) Ss did not hear the lecture.
Following the address in the E situation, however, nine discussion
groups were formed.

Each was composed of a former drug addict and 8-12 Ss.

They informally discussed (for 25 minutes) drug abuse as a social issue, as
well as the ex-addict 1 s personal experiences and insights.

When person-to-

person influences coincide with mass media messages, they either counteract
or reinforce the messages.

This is the

11

reinforcement function 11 of the

small albeit impromptu group condition.
And there is substantial reason to suspect, when the reinforcement is

positiv~,

the communication in question is

likely to be particularly effective (Katz and Lazarsfeld,
1955:45).
Because the effectiveness or success of the communication can be measured by
the breadth of factual information the S learns, the informal discussion session supplements the lecture in a cathartic way (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955;
80).

By providing an outlet for

lecture, the

11

11

talking out 11 questions stimulated by the

rap 11 session intervenes in the Ss 1 learning of the material.

This learning factor ..• operates in compicated ways in communication situations, where the time between learning and testing
is not a learning vacuum.

The intervening

social experiences

have an effect on the retention of a complex, socially signifi-

' Janis and Kelley, 1953:131).
cant communication (Hovland,
Furthermore, the interpersonal contact removes some of the emotional
insulation surrounding a given attitude or way of behaving.

-8-

This is the

r
intrinsic reward derived from the group's clarification of the lecture material.
The S's comprehension of the communication "evokes satisfying anticipations of
attaining a goal or of averting a threat"
And personal influence bec0111es a

11

(Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953:22 ).

facllltator 11 of change (Katz and Lazarsfeld,

1955:81).
Thus, any active participation device which augments retention
of the content of a communication may ultimately influence acceptance by increasing the chances that the content subsequently
wi 11 be thought about or expressed under conditions where reinforcement can occur.

One would expect this type of carry-over

effect to be especially. prominent in the case of persuasive communications which deal with opinions that are contingent upon
·retention of a high degree of information content .•• (Hovland,
Janis, and Kelley, 1953:233).
The

'~eedbac~'

of the group situation affords the S an opportunity to

reformulate the communication in his own words.
It is possible that reformulation per se may give rise to a
marked gain in

compreh~nslon

(italics theirs) of the content and

thereby augment the chances that the persuasive communication
will be influential.

Opinion change may be facilitated by the

mere act of translating the content into a more familiar vocabulary--perhaps by making It more meaningful in that the impli-

' more apparent and the conclusions
cations of the arguments become
more easily assimilated Into the person's existing cognitive framework of beliefs, expectation; and values (Hovland, Janis and Kelley,

-9-
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1953:233-234).
In sum, a climate of group discussion induces the S to improvise his own
ideas in response to or support of the communicator's conclusions.

Through

this reciprocity the probability that the Swill experience the type of reinforcements and anticipations which make for acceptance, remembrance, and
behavioral change is enhanced.

Indeed, this is the compelling role that per-

sonal influence plays.
Immediately after the Ss experienced one of the post-communication treatments (E or L), all completed a second thirty-question "objective"-type
exam on drug facts and terminology based on the lecture.
quest to indicate interest in a defined activity:

Included was a re-

"Would you be willing to

participate in a volunteer telephone service for helping. individuals with
drug problems if such a service were created in this community?"

Reply to

this question represents the extent of "positive solution-oriented" concern
(Fitzsimmons and Osburn, 1968:382) and reveals Ss dichotomized by "hi concern" and "lo concern."
Data on a second major variable emerge here, too.

Increase in drug

knowledge (DK)--comparing each S's score on Tes.t I and Test 11--is due presumably to the information absorbed from the formal lecture and reinforced
(in the E condition) by the unstructured interaction session with the exaddicts.

The catalytic role of the ex-addict in each E group intensifies

as the group gets larger (though in this case, not exceeding twelve in number)
Bales found that

'

•.• more and more communication is directed to one member of the
group (the most frequent commun·icator), thus reducing the relative

-JO-
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time the recipient of this increased attention begins to direct more and
more of his remarks to the group as a whole, and proportionately less to
specific individuals.

The communication pattern tends to 'centralize,•

In other words, around a leader through whom most of the communication
flows (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955:89-90).
Although the leadership of the ex-addict was built into the E condition,
It becomes "sanctioned" when the Ss gain cognizance of an addict 1 s presence.
He becomes tacitly
social location"

11

nominated 11 as a situational leader "by virtue of his

in the group.

His leadership inheres in the structure of

the evolving pattern of communication.

But moreover, the former addict is

a ··•culturally certified" leader who influences others because he occupies a
position in the group.

It is the group's particular culture or frame of

reference which endows the addict with the

11

right 11 to influence (Katz and

Lazarsfeld, 1955:99).
Leadership may refer to the point of origin of a plan or an idea, to
thesanction of the idea, or to the diffusion (italics theirs) of
the idea.

An individual qualifies as a key communicator if he ful-

fills any, or all of these roles.

(Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955:109).

While the Ss ascribe to him the status of an

11

authority, 11 they can relate to

him as a "peer" in every other way--age, appearance, general interests.

In-

deed, the ex-addict is both certified and approachable, ideal qualifications

.

for a "discussant" in the E treatment.
DK scores of control Ss exposed neither to the lecture nor the discussion
reflect individual inforn1ation-gefting behavior in the span between adminis-

-11-

tration of the two exams.

The contention is that the latter DK scores will

represent curiosity aroused by the first exam which motivated the S to pursue the drug topic and learn relevant material on his own.
Three days after the post-communication exam, a mimeographed "flyer"
inviting students to volunteer for the Maine Township "Hot Line" (HL) was
deposited under the door of each S's room (campus residence).

This memo

instructed him to sign up for the "training session" to be held fourteen
days hence.

There was a booth prepared at the rear of Niles' student dining

hall for the purpose of volunteering.

Only one evening hour (5:30-6:30 PM)

on two successive days, however, was allotted for this purpose.

Though action

(i.e., signing up) does not signify a final commitment to the HL program, it
does signal a readiness to translate recognition of the ·problem (Test I) into
constructive activity to abate the problem.

"Hi commitment" or "lo (lack of)

commitment," therefore, denotes the transition from an action orientation
(Test II) to "action imp! ications" (Cook, Burd and Talbert, 1970:359).

Con-

trol Ss were excluded from the voluntary activity, i.e., they were not formally notified about volunteering.
Because commitment as a behavioral tendency is a crucial variable antecedent to "action" (not measured per se in this study), it is considered a
primary outcome variable.

Since the ostensible reason for the study (and

for the sustained cooperation of the students) was given as ''an experiment
in knowledge decay, 11 a third DK exam was administered to all the Ss midway

'
between the distribution of flyers
and the scheduled training session.

This

thirty question objective exam measured the amount of decay (forgetting) in
DK over time (four weeks) among the three treatment groups (Hovland and Weiss,

-12-

1952; Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953:30-41; McGuire, 1968:254-258).
several researchers report that the more completely material is initlally learned the longer it will be remembered.

This claim harbors impor-

·tant imp! ications with respect to the repetition of major points, if their
retention is deemed desirable by the researcher.

Consequently, 30% of the

questions appearing on DK Tests II and III were identical to or adaptations
of questions asked on the previous exam.

The recal I and "relearning" of

detailed factual information warrants these repeated presentations (Hovland,
Janis and Kelley, 1953:248).

Also,

the extent to which communications will be retained would be expected
to be affected to a significant extent by the motivations and interests of the audience.

These will affect not only the quantity of

the material which will be retained but also certain of the qualitative features of what is retained ... The degree of interest in
material affects the extent to which the individual will learn the
content of the communication.

How well it has been learned will

then affect how well it will be retained.
which we are all familiar:

This is a phenomenon with

we learn what we are interested in (Hov-

land, Janis and Kelley, 1953:249-250).
'

Thus, past research recommends the usage of a .third DK exam for rendering the
study more "legitimate" from the S's perspective and lending continuity to
the investigation as a whole (Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield, 1949; Lana,
1959; Rosnow, 1966).

'

Action (i.e., the act of volunteering) can finally be examined in reference to cognitions about drugs progressing from interest to concern to
-13-

p
c011111itment and paralleled by an increase in drug knowledge.

Posited as the

central variable differentiating commitment to a voluntary program from nonc011111itment is the motivational influence of personal contact.
Why assign Ss to either an E or L treatment?

The inclusion of an "equi-

valent control group" that has not been exposed to the formal communication,
but for whom the same knowledge measures and personality measures are obtained, is a check on various artifacts.

These artifacts may give rise to

spurious relationships between a given trait and the amount of knowledge
change (Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield, 1949:329-340).

This "controlled

exposure design" is capable of yielding results which show how people on
different levels of a personality dimension are influenced by different communication milieux.
Control variables.
11

The personality dimension selected in this study is

closed-mindedness"--one aspect of the individual's total belief system "dis-

covered," conceptualized, tested, and revised by Rokeach (1961).

The past

decade, however, has witnessed a vigorous debate in the literature on the relation of intelligence to open- and closed-mindedness.

Hence, an academic

aptitude score based on the verbal section of the SAT (derived from the
student's admission records) and a Rokeach Dogmatism Scale score were obtained for each S.

These scores are hypothesized as accounting for, respec-

tively, the S's capacity to learn and his receptivity to new information, regardless of topic (Rokeach, 1961:286; Fitzsimmons and Osburn, 1968:381).
Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale' was designed to measure individual differences
In the extent to which belief systems are open or closed (1961:72).

After

defining dogmatism as "resistance to change of a total 5ystem of be! iefs, 11
-14-

Rokeach assessed the contribution of intelligence to the construct.

He found

a correlation of -.02 between intelligence (as measured by the American Coun-

cil on Education test) and scores on the Dogmatism Scale, and concluded that
·~tndings

in the present experiment cannot be accounted for by differences in

Intelligence" (1961:190-191).

Zagona and Zurcher 1 s data (1965a) also yield

a small negative correlation, but more significantly, support the validity
and test-retest reliability (for both high and low dogmatics) of the construct.

Ehrlich's findings (1961) corroborate two related hypotheses:

that

dogmatism is inversely related to classroom learning of sociology and that
academic aptitude and dogmatism are independent.

Christensen's replication

supports only Ehrlich's second hypothesis, while providing "no evidence that
dogmatism is related to classroom learning of psychology or differentially
related to abilities to synthesize or analyze" (1961:76). Frumkin reports
that low dogmatic individuals are more likely to earn high grades in sociology
than individuals who score high on Rokeach 1 s Dogmatism Scale.
A primary task for the sociology instructor. (is) to

h~lp

the

student to unlearn these myths which dominate his conception
of human behavior so that he might be free to gain objective
knowledge about man's behavior and nature .•. biased, dogmatic
individuals generally have a difficult time doing well in sociology courses (1961:403).
Ammunition for those espousing an intelligence-dogmatism interdependency

'
comes from Zagona and Zurcher's study
of 517 freshman college students enrol le
in psychology classes ~ta western university (1965b).

They explain that the

differences in performance found by Rokeach between high and low dogmatic in-15-

,...------·'

dividuals solving various integration- and synthesis-type tasks are relatively
independent of intellectual (verbal) ability.

"A statistically significant

(p<.01) relationship exists between factors s,eneral ly associated with intel 1 igence and scores on the Dogmatism Scale" (1965b:219).
Similarly, Ladd's data (1967) reveal that closed-mindedness hinders
Initial adaptation to concept-learning more than the capacity to solve such
problems, and that academic aptitude (measured by ACT scores) is positively
related to concept-learning proficiency.
·~erbal

In Fitzsimmons and Osburn's study

intelligence is an important factor in the learning of SIPA (social

issues and public affairs) materials,'' although 'bpen-mindedness, as measured
by the Dogmatism Scale, failed to predict information gain and changes in
attitudes, attitude dimensions, or potential behaviors"

(168:390-391).

Finally, Ehr! ich and Lee caution that
for some (cognitive) systems, open- and closed-minded persons will
not differ in their rates of learning or change ••. but Rokeach's
principle that high dogmatics are less able than low dogmatics to
learn new beliefs was upheld (1969:259).
Fortified by abundant data, the present research utilizes indices of
intelligence and dogmatism (Form E of the Rokeach Scale plus ten "dummy"
items mostly from the

Adorno~~

F Scale) as control variables.

In this

way, disparities in the learning of drug information and subsequent voluntary
action can be attributed to the experimental factor rather than to the

~

priori assessment of intellectual' (verbal) ability and the cognitive processes
of "the closed mind."

-*'"~---·~!'--'".
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Hypotheses.

,,,

The theoretical import of personal influence and its oper- I

ationalization in this research design dictates the proposal of the following
major hypotheses.

Since the experimental treatment is vital for the retention

of DK materials presented in the lecture, Hypothesis I (H 1 ) states:
The mean DK score (Test II) for the E group will be significantly
greater than the mean DK scores for either the Lor C group.

In

operational terms, DKE;:-- DKL5=DK .
5
Likewise, it is anticipated that the empathy and concern engendered by
the personal contact (i .e.,informal discussion) of experimental Ss with the
ex-addicts will be manifested by a positive response to the post-communication
inquiry (about prospective participation .in a service instituted to combat
the drug problems of local youth).
H2 :

Ss exposed to the E condition of personal influence will

respond positively to the question "Would you volunteer for
telephone service in a program designed to assist individuals
with drug problems, were such a program established

i~

this

community?" to a significantly greater extent than those Ss
not exposed (both Land C).
When the opportunity to volunteer for the HL program arises, the notion
of ''commitment to solution-oriented action" stressed in the E encounter wi 11
again motivate those Ss involved in the "interaction treatment" groups.
The percentage of E subjects who actually volunteer (sign up)

'

for HL service will be significantly greater than the percentage of
L subjects.
These three hypotheses encompass the process of converting factual
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Information, curiosity, and conversation with "culturally certified" sources
Into a demonstration of "personal responsibility" (Fitzsimmons and Osburn,
968:384).
1

Thus, both "learning" and "experience" (originating in and cir-

cumscribed by this experiment) are linked to purposive activity.
Assuming the equal distribution of SAT and dogmatism scores within the
E, L, and C groups (homogeneity of variance), a one-way analysis of variance
will be performed (Walker and Lev, 1953; Hays, 1963; Edwards, 1967).

lndi-

cators of a growing predisposition to act in consonance with one's knowledge
and experience consist of endorsement of a particular program and eventual
commitment to volunteer service in that program.

Ultimately, then, this

thesis specifies how knowledge and experience manipulated in the present
experimental context wi 11 affect observed action.

•·
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Chapter III
Findings and Analysis
Due to the populations involved, there exists a peculiar breakdown in
the demographic characteristics of the Ss.

The E group (N=54) accounts for

one-half of the total number of people in the experiment.

All of these Ss

are seminary students at Niles College, as are the 33 comprising the L group.
Whereas the E Ss are slightly older and one semester ahead of the freshman
L Ss, and the 21 C Ss drawn from an undergraduate social statistics course
at Loyola are, on the average, more than three years older and of secondsemester junior class standing.

Admittedly, two distinct academic popula-

tions are represented here (see Table 1), but as will presently be shown,
these potential biases inherent in the samples are experimentally control led.
The use of SAT and Dogmatism Scale Scores anti;cipates the possibility
of spurious results by discerning significant differences in intelligence
and open-mindedness across groups.

By identifying that the capacity of

the Ss to learn new material and their cognitive disposition to do so does
not vary significantly among respective groups, we can attribute any subsequent disparities in behavior to the differential experimental conditions. As
seen in Table 2, nothing intrinsic to the members of the three groups so
composed will either facilitate or hamper their later performance.

We may

conclude that the two "traits" metsured in Table 2 are randomly distributed
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the three groups are qualitatively (i.e., psychologically) comparable.
Primary Analysis:

Testing of Hypothesis.

The comparability of the group

In intellectual ability and belief systems has been ascertained.

Now we can

assess the amount of drug knowledge the Ss possessed prior to experimental
exposure.

Table 3 reveals that all three groups were approximately equally

knowledgeable about drug facts and terminology.

This finding legitimates

the formal lecture as a stimulus situation where new information is systematically presented.

The way this information is processed and the extent to

which it is retained are implicit in the structure of the two experimental
treatments.

In the L treatment, the 25-minute presentation by a credible

communicator was followed by a question-and-answer period.

Here, the audience

(Ss) was restricted to an essentially passive role in asking questions, while
the communicator was instructed to confine his answers to the text of his
2Decreased N's are due to the permission to use SAT scores and administration of the Dogmatism Scale--both of which appeared as part of the third
instrument.

Because some Ss refused to permit the Registrar from releasing

their SAT scores or never took the test as a college entrance requirement
and others failed to complete and return the third instrument, all groups N's
were depleted.

Of critical import is the attrition rate for the two experi-

mental conditions.

Chi-squares computed for Ss not taking the SAT and the

Dogmatism Scale are 0.07, I df artd 0.22, 1 df, respectively.

These non-

significant chi-squares indicate that attrition did not differ across E and

L conditions.
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paper, i.e., his remarks were
statements previously made.
In contrast, the E Ss, after hearing the identical address, were divided
into six 9-12 man groups.

A young ex-drug addict was assigned to each where,

as a "culturally certified" leader, he conducted an informal discussion on
the topic of drugs.

Postulated as a supplemental information-getting device,

this interpersonal exchange situation becomes a medium for the flow of "personal influence" from addict to S (and S to S).

This post-lecture E condition

ts therefore hypothesized as reinforcing the material presented in the formal
communication and facilitating its retention.

Using the DK scores for Test

II, this hypothesis (H ) was tested. Inspection of Table 4, however, shows
1
that the predicted difference in learning between the E and the L groups. did
not occur.

In fact, Ss experiencing the L treatment earned a higher mean

score than the E Ss.

The overall F-value of II .78 for the analysis of vari-

ance denotes that some difference among treatments exists.

It suggests that

the Ss experiencing the two experiemental treatmeots Jearned_more than the
C Ss who were not exposed to the informative message.

A significant differ-

ence between the pooled E plus L mean and the C mean confirms (t=S.25, p<.001
for a two-tailed test) the efficacy of the lecture vs. no communication, but
refutes the hypothesized reinforcement function of personal influence in the
Interacting small group.
An underlying theme of this research is that the bond be tween what one

•

knows and what one does is intimate indeed.

By measuring the degree of one's

general voluntary behavior (extra-curricular service activities) and his propensity to volunteer for a program based on a community need to assuage, if
-21-
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not eradicate, the problem of drug abuse, the produndity of that bond can be
demonstrated.

Besides yielding measures of DK, Tests I and II trace the de-

velopment of an attitude consonant with that knowledge by (1) estimating the
extant level of the Ss' participation in volunteer activities, and (2) engendering interest, concern, and finally, commitment to a specific program.
The research and instruments were so designed to create awareness of a problem and supply a goal for its

11

resolution. 11 What is distinctive ·about this

means-ends schema is that the experiment sought to impel the Ss (through the
dispensation of information) to adopt an "action orientation 11 for achieving
the goal {by volunteering).
Despite the moderate percentages of -"high voluntary" particpation (two
or more activities) by E and L Ss (29.6% and 30.3% of each respective group),
the interest and concern in a drug-related activity elicited via lecture and
discussion are provocative.

Table 5 indicates that there was virtually no

difference between the percentage of E and L Ss who were "interested," while
more than half of the C Ss--none of whom qual ifiep as "high _voluntary participators"--were interested in an activity (as yet undefined) for combating
drug abuse.

Furthermore, the C group, without the benefit of the lecture or

the addict encounter, heightened its empathy over time, whereas the "positive
solution-oriented concern" of the E and L groups diminished.

The combined

percentage "concerned" of these latter groups is significantly smaller than
the C group's percentage (p<.10).

' states that E Ss will respond positively
This finding negates H2 which
to the question ''Would you volunteer for telephone service in a program designed to assist individuals with drug problems, were such a program estab-.
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Jished in this community?" to a significantly greater extent than either Lor

c Ss. Not only is this hypothesis not borne out empirically, but the rankorder of concern is seemingly reversed with C Ss manifesting the greatest will
ingness to engage in the emergency telephone program (see Table 6).

Perhaps

this concern explains the absence of decay in the C group's third DK exam
scores.

.

Contrary to the debilitating effects of time in dissipating the

amount of DK retained--a "normal" phenomenon--the C Ss improved tliei r mean
knowledge with the two-week increment of time.

Again, by pooling the E and

L means for Tests II and III, the mean decay for Ss in the experimental
treatments can be compared to the "decay" of the C Ss.
the former Ss was negligible (t=0.78);

t~e

The forgetting of

increase in DK of the C Ss, how-

ever, is impressive (t=3.18, p<.OJ for a two-tailed test) and defies explanation at this point.
Considering the serendipitous content of the findings thus far, the
third major hypothesis of this study emerges as unique in its simple discreditation.

Partly because only twelve of the

~7

Ss in

th~

E and L groups

(13.8%) signed up for HL service, the percentage of E Ss who volunteered was
~significantly

greater than the percentage of L Ss, as noted in Table 7.

The modicum of difference between the two percentages does not even warrant
statistical rejection, though a test was performed (non-significant at .JO).
Before summarily dismissing the motivational influence of "learning"
and personal contact as they were experimentally operationalized and mani-

•

pulated, one can dwell briefly on the process of assimilating information over
time.

This incorporation and recollection process has here been termed

"re I earning" and refers so I e 1y to those i terns on Tes ts II and III which
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appeared almost verbatim on each preceding exam.

An item analysis of Test I I

shows that 23.3% of the questions were repeated from Test I and 36.6% of Test

III material was introduced on Test II.

The analysis of variance for these

select items discloses that the differential treatments were non-trivial and
somewhat effective (see Table 8) in imparting information which was readily
recalled by subsequent DK exams.

A post ho.c test of the pooled E plus L

mean vs. the C mean supports the relearning hypothesis (t=4.SO, p(.001 for a
two-tailed test) that repetitive presentation of a question (e.g.,

11

The

highest incidence of drug use is found in a. medical professionals, b. clergy,
c. college students, d. minority groups. 11 ) discussed in the lecture and/or
small group was internalized by the E and L Ss. ·
Nevertheless, in the interim between administration of Tests II and III,
decay takes its toll, depressing relearning scores for both experimental
aggregates on the one hand, and inflating the mean score of the C group on
the other.

3

This regression phenomenon for relearning scores replicates and

amplifies the data in Table 6.

.

\

Therein the relative level of DK for each

.

group and its evaluation v1s-a-v1s scores for Test I I are portrayed.

In

short, the inevitability of forgetting is tantamount to a consistency in relearning:

both are predictable across groups.

ever, vary with experimentally-induced

-

11

Their manifestations, how-

learning 11 and

11

experience 11 or the

lack of each.
3This is not evident in Table 9 since more items were inadvertently

'

repeated on Test III and no standardization procedure, e.g., converting
to proportions or addi.ng a constant, was employed.
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Secondary Analysis:

Collapsing of Groups.

Since the E condition un-

successfully evoked the hypothesized behavior (superior OK gain and higher
Jevels of concern and volunteering), it seems fruitful to reassess all S
according to criteria peripheral to the central focus of the research.
Before abandoning the original group design and di6hotomizing the Ss by "hi"
and "lo" participation in extra-curricular voluntary activities and by "hi"
and "lo" interest {Test I), a fleeting glance at the trichotomy must be
cast .. This perusal should lend credence to the decision to dissolve the
experimentally-delineated boundaries between treatment groups.
When interest is linked as an independent variable to Test II and DK
scores, the means for each group divided into "hi" and "lo" segments barely
differ.

Across groups, the disparities in means are compatible with the

findings reported above.

However, when the groups are collapsed, thereby

neutralizing the treatment effects, those Ss professing "lo" interest
achieve higher DK scores on Test II (see column 1 of Table 10).

The result-

ant t-value of 2.19 is significant at the .05 level of probability (for a
two-tailed test).

Thus, Ss can be motivated to learn though devoid of any

interest in a volunteer activity predicated on the material learned.

This

lack of enthusiasm transcends group affi I iation (and differential "experience"), but begets speculation by this researcher on the operation of an,,.
other factor.

'

A realignment of the "lo" interest Ss by the variable of extra-curricula
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service4 produces no discernible differences in mean DK scores on Test II.
When "hi" interest Ss are distributed with respect to voluntary behavior
(Table JI), the mean difference is formidable (t=2.63, p(.02 for a twotailed test).

To conclude that a volunteer "set" or predilection to parti-

cipate In service-oriented organizations prompts the learning of technical
information relevant to the service would be facile and incorrect, especially since "lo" interest Ss excel when dimensions of voluntary action are
disregarded (as conveyed by column I of Table 10).
To confound the picture even more, the impact of interest on DK decay
can be gauged.

DK over time?

Do "hi" and

11

1011 interest equal Jy sustain the magnitude of

By surveying the first row of Table JO, we notice that the

mean DK scores of "hi" interest Ss did not decay over time.

Instead, the

opposite tendency (similar to that evinced by the C group) appears:
accretion of knowledge over time.

an

At-value of 1.93 (p(.10 for a two-tailed

test) verifies albeit weakly this gain.
Still another look at Table JO (row 2) shows. that conventional,
though
.
not statistically significant, decay plagues the "Jo" interest group.

Like-

wise, if we shift from a longitudinal to a cross-sectional perspective, we
observe (in column 2 of Table 10) little absolute difference in the means
for the "hi" and "lo" interest group.

Indeed, "hi" interest endures in the·

. 4us.ing the intuitive criteria of two or more voluntary activities as
"hi voluntary behavior" and one or less as "lo voluntary behavior," a preliminary test of the independence' of this and the interest variable was performed.

The resultant chi-square of 0.036 (106 df, not significant) sup-

ports the hypothesis of attribute independence.
-26-

r-----Jong run and

11

1011 interest prevails when DK Is evaluated at a particular

instant (Test II).

The net effect is a learning impasse:

gravitate-toward a mutual level of DK.

both groups

In essence, time and interest can-

cel each other out.
The "concern" component represents another possible antecedent to learning.

Curiously, only minute differences in nK means for Test III exist with-

In each treatment group--E, L, and C--and between the two contingents of Ss
reconstituted by the "concern" and "no conce rn 11 responses so Ii cited on Test
II.

This means that either (I) incipient interest exceeds "personal respon-

sibility 11 (or concern) in forecasting who will learn more or (2) that time
Is a more potent intervening variable in eroding DK than "hi" interest and
concern.
The issue of continuity between interest and concern--whether the S is
interested in the beginning in any activity salutary to the drug abuser and
is correspondingly concerned about its success--merits more detailed investigation.

For an attitude which integrates these two operationalized phases

will dictate unequivocal support for the telephone service formally proposed
on Test II.

Conversely, a S asserting "hi lnterest 11 - 11 no concern" or

11

10

interest 11 -"concern 11 reflects a neutra 1 or transitory posture toward the
issue--an issue more arduously defined by the "HL flyer" distributed to
foster an "action orientation."

Thus, as the time for volunteering draws

near, the requests for commitment become more specific and urgent.

Is the

f

affinity, then, between interest and concern concomitantly strong?
Table 12 depicts a series of contingency tables for two subsample
·of Ss--the 79 who completed al 1 measures and the 29 who presumably lost
-27-

.

r .~·'·
interest in the experiment and withdrew after Test II.

The significant chi-

squares of both testify to the high probability of association between attributes.

Not only does the H0 of independence not hold, but the strength of th

interest-concern association for each subsample as computed for Pearson's
coefficient of contingency5 (0.61 for N=79, 0.52 for N=29, 0.61 for total
N=J08) is substantfal.

These data signify the cumulative nature of the in-

terest-concern proposition.

Its promotion by experimental tactics seems

certain (even in the abortive subsample).

A lingering question, however,

is to what extent were most Ss predisposed to endorsing any social action
program, i.e., were the Ss attitudinally committed to "change" when they
entered the experiment or were they selectively subscribing (by expressing
interest and concern) to the problem at hand and the servke created to rel i eve it?
In the cumulative process of penetrating the S' cognitive structure and
instilling in him a consciousness of the drug problem, "concern" embodies tha
portion of the message that just precedes the behavioral (and consummatory)
facet of the experiment --the signing up for volunteer service in the Hot Lin
As evidenced in Table 13, the association

b~tween

the variables of concern

and volunteering for HL duty is statistically uncorroborated (X~=0.043 with
Yates• correction for continuity).

But moreover, if one concentrates momen-

-5The maximum C in a 2X2 table equalsW. where t equals the number of
rows in the table.

Therefore thf Cmax here equals 0.707.

For a sophisticate

treatise of alternatives to chi-squares based measures of association for
nominal data, see Costner, 1965,.or McGinnis, 1958.
-28-
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tarily on column 1, he surmises that twice as many Ss who signed up admitted
"no concern" compared to those affirming "concern," the low N notwithstanding
This

fin~ing,

too, defies all (theoretical and experimental) expectation.

Comprising the "residual" analysis is the relation of general voluntary
behavior to the primary outcome variable--volunteering for the HL.

Table 14

validates that such an association is statistically tenable 0:2=3.22, p<.10),
though not overwhelming.
sheer conjecture.

Much can be inferred from this datum, yet much is

Is a voluntary behavior "set" operating?

Are people who

participate in many voluntary activities and organizations just joining another when they sign up for the Hot Line?

Do "joiners" discriminate among

"causes" and choose where they prefer to expend time and energy?

Or is it

just fashionable to be part of a movement oriented towards a contemporary
social problem like "drugs and youth"?
An alternative to this "positive association" interpretation is one that
explores the interdependence of "lo" voluntary behavior and non-volunteering
for the HL--the modal category in Table 13.

If most college students do not

usually volunteer their services at all, then why should they volunteer for
the HL?

Non-joiners are simply non-joiners, irrespective of the cause or

movement involved.

.

Thus, this "negative" or non-association proclivity com-

plements, and simultaneously promulgates, the notion of a volunteer "set"
or desire to affiliate with a multitude of "in" action groups (perceived as
organs of social change):
A foremost consideration is' also the population from which 80.6% of the
Ss in the experiment was drawn, i.e. seminary students.

These students are

encouraged as part of theirpreparation for the priesthood to render some

voluntary community service called an "Apostolate."

Working in a hospital

or nursing home, teaching catechism in local elementary and high schools, con
ducting community seminars and masses, and organizing community social and
day-care centers in ghetto areas are typical activities subsumed under the
Apostolate, which has become institutionalized as requisite for the "formation" of the seminarian. 7
Perhaps this and other obligations incumbent upon the Niles Ss precluded
their participation in the HL program.

Their academic situation and spiri-

tual training, however, propitiate the signing up of a large proportion.
This seems commensurate with the "personal responsibility" the students
should more readily manifest.
was not forthcoming.

Ostensibly, commitment to voluntary action

One, therefore, is compelled to recognize that the

mundane realities of time and prior commitment militate against extra-curricular volunteering.

Doubtless, experimental shortcomings proposing an ob-

jective, offering knowledge and experience as an incentive, and motivating
individuals to express interest and concern in the appropriate channel can
be cited.
Before the shortcomings of the design are probed in the following chapte
a methodological addendum.seemsfitting.

The measures functioning as control

variables--the SAT and Rokeach Dogmatism Scale scores--are amenable to more
extensive analysis.

Especially in deference to the diverse, and somewhat in-

congruous, findings in the Dogmatism literature, a correlational analysis of

" seems obligatory.
intelligence and closed-mindedness
7My thanks to Bruce Such. for this and other insights into the Niles College population.
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Of greatest empirical import is the correlation coefficient for SAT and
dogmatism scores of the 57 Ss on whom all measures were obtained.

The r=-.255

indicates an inverse relationship between the Ss' capacity to learn new information and the receptivity or willingness to assimilate such information into
their cognitive structure.

To test the H0 : r=O, we transform the data-bred

c;:orrelatfon into a t-value of 2.04 which is significant at the .05 level of
probability.

Similar efforts to relate SAT-DK gain and dogmatism-DK gain

yield diminutive correlations {less than 0.00) for both the N=57 subsample
and the N=79 subsample which includes 22 who lack SAT scores.

Partial corre-

lation coefficients were concomitantly small.
Thus, the recent trend ·in the literature is supported by the negative
linear relationship deduced from the present data,

This relationship, how-

ever, is reported with reservation until larger samples more representative
of the secular college population are secured and tested.

This impediment

to the research of unique collectivities means, in the end, constricted generalization~-and

reliability--of findings.

'

Chapter IV
Interpretation of Findings
The failures of the research design are manifold in that the three explicit hypotheses were empirically unfounded.

In re-examining the formulation

we can pursue two heuristic goals--interpretations of the present data as they
append to the burgeoning literature and implications for future experimentation.
Efficacy of the Small Group Milieu.

Suffice it to say that the demarca-

tion between treatment groups Jacked clarity.

Apparently, execution of the

prescribed behaviors could have been more stringently controlled.

For example

the post-lecture discussion session where the ex-addicts exercised personal
influence was structured to enhance the drug knowledge of the E Ss.
supposedly accomplished through the

11

This was

improvisation 11 of Ss in verbal !zing

points made· in the lecture and the reinforcement of that factual information
by the addict-authority.

Whether such behavior ever materialized prompts

two critical observations about the quality or content of the subject-addict
exchange and the duration of the discussion session.

The researcher suspects

that the ex-addicts substituted the communication of personal experiences and
technique (e.g., how to "skinpop 11 a drug, what sensations accompany the "nod, 11
or what are typical symptoms of heroin withdrawal) for an elaboration of facts
set forth in the lecture.

Because the addicts were not constrained to com-

ment on the various terms or statistics transmitted in the formal address,
those elements could have escaped the S who was not asked to deliberate on
something to which the addict nei.ther directed his attention nor reinforced.
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Pertinent, too, is the insufficient time that was allotted for the interpersonal contact situation.

An expansion of the 25 minute period to 45 or 60

minutes would serve a dual purpose.

First, it would expedite the addicts•

nomination, location, and cultural certification as a "facilitator" of learnIng in the group (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955:81).

As the addict 9.!:!2. leader

becomes sanctioned as an "informational social influence"

(Deutsch and Gerard·

1955:629), the Ss are apt to accept information from him as "evidence about
reality. 11 Between "the expression that he gives and the expression that he
gives off"

(Goffman, 1959:2), the addict capitalizes upon situational cues

to embellish his image and aggrandize his status in the group (Alexander and
Epstein, 1969:383, 393).

Only then can he evoke a

·~efinition

of the situa-

tion" (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1927:68) in the Ss' minds which concretizes his
(I) personification of certain values (who he is), (2) his competence (what
he knows), and (3) his strategic social location (whom he knows) (Katz, 1957:
205).

Hence, the Ss' perception of the addict validates his role and his

performance.

The subsequent flow of influence has been anticipated by two

diametric approaches to the phenomenon:

Heider's "interest in the cognitive

structures of causality attribution" and the "interpersonal imputation processes" that form the very core of classic symbolic interactionist theory
!

(Alexander and Epstein, 1969:382).

This initial perception will not only be

a determining factor in learning the material presented in the lecture, but
wi 11 have "a persisting effect on the remembering process" (Hovland, Janis
and Kelley, 1953:252).

'

By interpolation, the interface of Sand addict (or leader and follower}
constitutes the former 1 s justification as a
-33-

11

significant other'' in a temporary
LOYOLA UNIVERSlrY LI

r---------~--------------------------version of the Meadian concept.

His salient position in this contrived small

group8 is both a function of the information he disseminates (even indirectly:
and the attitude(s} he alters.
Structural factors influence the kinds of significant others to
which ego is exposed, and the kinds of information that those
significant others communicate

to ego, and that information •••

provides the basic corpus out of which he sets his attitudes.
That information is evaluated in terms of its consistency with
previously accumulated information (i.e., other related attitudes) and results in the new attitude (Woelfel and Haller,

1971:76-77).
In this sense, the affective and cognitive components of the E S's
attitude are modified by the discussion session.

Lewin's pioneer work is onc1

again supportive:
decision in a group setting seems to be effective even if the
group is not a permanent organization (1947:430).
But no such decision was ever reached in the small groups because the leader
never ended the discussion with a request that individuals publicly announce
their decision regarding the prescribed action.

Since the Ss were never so

informed, their intentions never became known, and their participation in
the Hot Line was never overtly enlisted.

8

Logistically, therefore, the design

f

Though small in size and featuring informal face-to-face contact, this

group does not fulfill the rest of Cooley's (1909) comprehensive "primary
group" definition--relative durability and "manifold, or more or less unspecialized, purpose."
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violated Lewin's basic procedure. 9
Just as the E treatment encouraged spontaneity, so did it discourage
uniformity in the substance of the verbal exchange transpiring in each group.
Briefing of the addicts as to the tenor and purpose of their remarks is a
sound precaution.

Without it, "personal influence" can be irrelevant to the

specified objective of the experiment.
Motivation to Learning and Voluntary Action.

Apart from the finding

(see Tables 4 and 8) that E Ss did not learn more despite structural conduciveness {Hypothesis 1), their interest and concern were inordinately low
relative to the C group {see Table 5).
learning and the retention ·of DK?
precedented, they are uncommon.

How do interest and concern affect

Though the current findings are not unFitzsimmons and Osburn report that

Ss, prior to exposure, were (1) already moderately willing to
go out of their way to gain further. information, (and) (2) personally willing to devote some volunteer time ... (1968:388).
Table 12 reveals the Ss' similar inclinations and their impact on Hypothesis
2.

Even if we assume that the audience initially has only a rather passive

interest, then the arousal of motivation to learn the message is essential
for a gain in drug knowledge.
<

91t may have also deviated from ideal small group size of 3-8 and had an
inhibiting effect on the Ss.

Although Bales and Homans agree that this large

membership wi 11 "centralize" the 'communication pattern around the leader,
others argue that the leader's influence is thereby attenuated.
and Lazarsfeld, 1955:88-90.
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See Katz

Retention may also be affected by the degree to which the person
is motivated on subsequent occasions to try to recall the material
learned.

Degree of motivation frequently affects the degree to

which the individual will rehearse the material he has learned
(Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953:250).
"Rehearsal" or "improvisation" in the smal I group mi I ieu proved ineffectual.

But drug knowledge scores also vacillated because too little informa-

tion was repeated on each exam.

Thus, instead of "relearning," Ss were re-

quired to assimilate new material that was presented on each exam.

Perhaps

this task accounts for the erratic means of the groups computed in row 1 and
column I of Table JO.

The plethora of terms and facts dispensed in the for-

mal communication (lecture) and on the three drug tests may have overloaded
the cognitive apparatus of the Ss who either "tun.ed out" or selectively
filtered fragments of information into their minds.
Fitzsimmons and Osburn, in testing the Hyman and sheatsley "selective
perception" hypothesis (1947), found that there was no discernible influence
of initial attitude positions on the learning and retention of pertinent
information.

Yet virtually all Ss who scored low on the pre-experimental

test of knowledge about television news documentaries proceeded to learn a
'

great deal, and often revised their attitudes toward this journalistic appreach to pub I i c affairs and social issues.

They cone l ude that "the ex-

perience of 'finding out how little one knows• may facilitate change" (Fitzsimmons and Osburn, 1968:392).

'
Future
studies on the dynamics of learning

would profit from the repetition of at least 50% of all material in a series
of "technical" knowledge exams.
-36-
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From Hypothesis 3 we have inferred that the commitment of the E Ss was
no greater than that of the L Ss

(se~

Table 7).

This finding impels one to

search for a clue to understanding the alliance between motivation and action
(signing-up).

Lewin advises us

to study the particular conditions under which a motivating
constellation leads or does not lead to a decision or to an equivalent process through which a state of 'considerations' (indecisiveness) in changed into a state where the individual has
'made up his mind' and is ready for action, although he may not
act at that moment (1947:428).
This underpinning of Lewin'.s research converges with the present thesis that
lecturing may lead to a high degree of interest.
the motivation of the listener.

It

~ay

affect

But it seldom brings about a

definite decision on the part of the listener to take a certain
action at a certain time.

A lecture is not often conducive to

decision (1947:428).
Katz and Lazarsfeld venture that
the individuals in the lecture and private situations might
even have been as 'motivated' to change as those in the discussions, but that the chances of translating their motivations into action were considerably reduced when the action
demanded unilateral departure--as far as these individuals

'
knew--from some socially accepted
way of doing things {1955:
78).
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If volunteering was inhibited in this way, then a favorable attitude
toward the Hot Line was not embedded in perceptions that the attitude object
(i.e., the Hot Line) would "guarantee" need satisfaction.

Indeed,

change in an attitude was attempted by increasing the S's awareness of the instrumentality of the attitude object for attaining
a specified need rather than an indirect orientation toward
multiple needs or values (DiVesta and Merwin, 1960:285).
Whereas attitude shifts may act as an intermediary between information
gain and adoption of an action orientation (Fitzsimmons and Osburn, 1968;390)
this orientation or commitment is in itself not motivating (Kiesler, 1968).
Furthermore, unless the attendant cognitions have reward-cost implications
for the chosen course of action they will have no effect on the person's
cognitive work and will themselves be unaffected (Gerard, 1968).
The data presented in Tables 10 and_l3 negate the confluence of motivation, information, and commitment on voluntary action.
bifurcated roots in the social science literature.

Yet this finding has

Fitzsimmons and Osburn

detect no relationship between information gain and changes in potential behavior in reaction to television documentaries (1968:390), while Cook, Burd,
and Talbert conclude that
if the opportunity to perform an attitude-relevant act is not
made immediately available, then the (presumed) attitudinal
predisposition to perform the behavior will become progressively
f

less strong as time goes by.

What this makes salient is that tests

of the relationship between attitude and behavior should assess
attitude and behavior immediately after receiving a message, if
-38..;.

r
this is possible (1970:368).
Did delayed administrationof·the DK tests interfere with the reinforcement
mechanism of personal influence as it impinged on the conative (behavioral)
aspect of the S's attitude? Heider (1958), we believe, would nod affirmative]
and allude to attitude structure as a causal factor; Katz and Stotland would
opt for attitude functions declaring that

'~here

the primary function of an

-

attitude is to gain understanding of one's world, there is little reason to
expect overt behaviora I changes"' 0

(Fitzsimmons and Osburn, 1968: 394).

The element of time not only dilutes the S's motivation (interest, concern, and commitment), but also hastens knowledge decay.

An obstacle to

cognitive functioning, time mitigates retention of certain information
("selective forgetting") as it robs decisional outcomes that were important
at an earlier time of their saliency and their urgency (Waister and Berscheid

1968:605-607),
The data summarized in Tables 6 and 9 do not contradict McGuire's
appraisal of the deleterious effects of source, message, and receiver factors
occurring with the passage of .time (1968:254).

12 suggest two divergent trends:

Nevertheless, Tables 10 and

(I) that there is an information-processing

delay in receiving the formal communication, but (2) that any induced attitude change tends to become functionally autonomous of broader aspects of
the communication that are retained (McGuire, 1968:256-258).

Such recol-

lection is predictable:

'
IOFestinger, in his Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957), strives to do
both, i.e., capture the balance of attitude and action that is Imperiled by
workaday interaction.

Once an individual decides on a course of action--and especially after he commits himself to follow it--all cognitive work
seems focused on consolidating and making the best of the decision {Aronson, 1968:611).
Thus, the operation of interest and commitment {volunteering) "sets" {Tables
11, 12, and 14) enters the realm of both theoretical and empirical plausibility, if not probability.
Attitudes and Behavior:

A Methodogical Purview.

A methodological ad-

junct is submitted, howeve.r, by Mi I !er:
The researcher typically concludes the experiment by tacking on a measure of retention and then reports .that the lack of differences
implies that the effects of the experimental treatment on attitudes were not mediated by differences in retention.

While the

most obvious criticism of this procedure is to question the
sensitivity of the measure of recall, an alternate hypothesis
is that motivated forgetting is less I ikely. to appear _if attempts to measure it are always positioned last {Miller, 1968:
598).
The ramifications of this contention are cogent:

just as a S can be more or

less receptive to a message, so may his decay in learning be a methodological
imperative, i.e., a function of the design involved. 11
Within this framework, the limitations imposed upon the generalizability

'

11 For an exhaustive survey of experimental designs and sources of invalidlty therein, see Campbell (1957), Campbell and Stanley (1963), Ross and
Smith (1968), and Wiggins (1968).
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of the current findings can be weighed.

Despite the student sample (of

predominantly seminarians, to boot) used, .Fitzsimmons and Osburn assert
that
this population represents an excellent group upon which to test
a theory of rationally based attitudes, where information gain
is critical.

Support for such an attitude function would then

call for further testing of a more heterogeneous population -(1968:

392).
In this case, a sampling of students at many seminary schools in the Midwest
could be fruitful, though the use of Ss not immersed in a religious preparatory curriculum would yield indices of more widespread application.

This

revision would also prescribe a deletion of variables and the discarding of
hypotheses (Wiggins,

1968:390).

In retrospect, Katz (1960) observes that since our educational system
relies on a rational mode of fact communication; the value of intelligence
and comprehension in the fonna ti on and change of. a man's at.ti tu des has become sancrosanct.

This value is implicit in Rokeach's attempt to identify

a cognitive structure that could account for receptivity to new information,
regardless of topic.

The present data replicate the failure of Fitzsimmons

and Osburn's study to support the intervening role of "open-mindedness," as
measured by the Dogmatism Scale, in the learning

of information (1968:396).

But while dogmatism scores did not predict attitude shifts in their inves-

'
tigation, open-mindedness was significantly
correlated with intelligence for
57 of our Ss. Fitzsimmons and Osburn's interpretation of their failure is
profoundly linked to our partial success.
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Initial position on a variety of variables failed to have the
'controlling' function over subsequent changes that frequently
has·been ascribed to it.

This seems to imply that people will

change or fail to change despite their initial position on
some of these variables.

The authors believe that there may

be a difference between learning information that does not
particularly contrast with held values, and learning information that is in opposition to beliefs.

In this latter

case, the construct of open-mindedness may well come into
play (1968:397).
A final recommendation for further experimentation in the domain of atti
tudes and motivated learning springs from a theme pervading small groups research:

Is the jump from cognitive concern (i.e., based on knowledge and

interest) to an action orientatiQn to action warranted?

Because attitudes

are hierarchically-ordered predispositions to behave in various ways, it
follows
that changes in these predispositions should be followed by
corresponding changes in behavior.
in attitudes

~hould

Furthermore, such changes

produce enduring and general changes in

behavior if attitudes are themselves enduring and generalized.
Research relevant to this topic has unfortunately indicated
that such a conclusion is false.

Changes in attitude are not

'

necessarily accompanied by changes in behavior.

(And) when

changes in behavior do occur, they are rarely, if ever, general
or enduring (Zimbardo and Ebbesen, 1970:85).
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If attitude change does not lead to behavior change (Cook, Burd, and

Talbert~

1970:368), then the conception of the transition mentioned above may, indeed,
be fallacious. 12

If so, the transmission of information and its reinforce-

ment through personal influence may be approached in a "social learning" context, whereby crucial bits of information held by the Ss are ascertained,
and a technique (e.g., persuasive corR111unications) which is most likely to
produce a change in such information is implemented.

Thus,

by changing the expected consequences for engaging in the crucial
behavior, or by changing the associations with a crucial stimulus,
we can change~ specific behavior ... (Zimbardo and Ebbesen, 1970:
93).
12similarly, the prevailing theories of attitude change (see McGuire,
1968:265-272) may need reconceptualization--if external behavior does not
conform to the approximation of internal cognitive states.
dictive power of the theories is deflated.

'
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If so, the pre-

Chapter V
Conclusion
This study has demonstrated that the concept of "personal influence"
derived from panel-type

fi~ld

data does not hold in a small groups setting.

Specifically, the "quasi-experimental" design (Campbell and Stanley, 1963),
though simulating laboratory controls, did not induce differential learning,
concern, and commitment to voluntary action as hypothesized.

Instead, un-

wieldy group size, irrelevant informal communication, limited duration of
the small group session, and time-delay in the administration of drug knowledge examinations encumber. the flow of personal influence in motivating
seminary students to learn factual information about a social problem (attitude object) and adopt an "action orientation" for its resolution.

The oper-

ation of these exogenous variables suggests (1) that while initial interest
in the attitude object is not a prime incentive to learning, (2) interest is
highly associated with subsequent concern for an activity proposed as a
deterrent to the problem.

Yet (3) this endorsement of a voluntary program

cannot be equated with a willingness to participate in it; rather, (4)
individuals who participate in many volunteer activities are more apt to
engage in another of social and topical significance.

Thus, interest and

volunteer behavior "sets" seem to be most predictive of eventual voluntary
action.
A moderate, though statistic'ally significant, correlation between Dogmatism Scale scores and SAT scores implies that an individual's aptitude for
learning new material is associated with the belief system or cognitive path
-l14-

of "open-mindedness" or receptivity to that material.

The .addition of this

datum to the above findings indicates that (1) "personal influence" must be
refonnulated, or at least modified, in a "small groups" context to underscore
the reinforcement function of the culturally-certified informational leader,
(2) a more parsimonious 'pre-posl' design encompassing the variables of learning, attitudes, and behavior in a cumulative way be employed, and (3) the
theoretical interplay of attitudes and behavior be reconceptualized so that
a "threshold of saliency" can be identified.

Only then will an attitudinal

dimension become empirically reliable and both the transmitters and objects
of personal influence more purposively pursued in the field, and in the lab,
as 'well.

'
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Table 1
Demographic Characteristics:

Means

Group

N

E

54

18.6

1.5

L

33

18.0

1.0

c

21

21.8

3.5

Age

Year in School

Table 2
Control Variables: Means and Variance Table
(Dogmatism onlv)

E

28

516.6

37

129.8

L

18

507.9

21

135.7

c

11

511.0

21

133.2

Source of
Variation

SS

df

MS

F

1.058*

502.51

2

251. 26

W-tthin Groups

18043.91

76

237.42

Total

18546.42

78

Between Groups

*not significant

1··-

·Y'>~-.,,..--~~--~-,,_,..._,~-~,~-·-~'~U-

...

~

.,_,. - ·

i

Table 3
Pre-lecture (Test I) Drug Knowledge Scores:
Means and Variance Table

N

Store

E

54

26.59

l

33

26.06

c

21 '

26.43

Groue

Source of
Variation

SS

Between Groups

5.82

Within Groups
Total
;~not

.

significant

df

MS

F

2

2.91

0. 296;t

1032.06

105

9.83

1037.88

107

Table 4
Post-lecture {Test II) Drug Knowledge Scores Comparison of Experimental and Control Conditions:
Means and Variance.Table
Group

N

Score

E

54

27.09

L

33

28.36

E+L

87

27.57

c

21

24.38

Source of.
Vari at ion

SS

df

MS

F

11 . 78*

Between Groups

205.64

2

102.82

Within Groups

917.13

105

8.73

1122. 77

. 107

Total
*p<.01

Table 5
Percentage of Groups Expressing lnterest (Test I} and Concern (Test II)
in Voluntary Drug-related Activity

··croup

·%Interest

·%concern

E

40.7

33.3

L

39,3

36.4

E+L

40.2

34.5

c

52.4

57.1

---------·---·---.,,··~-------·

~

- - · - · · - - - - - ..... .-.

4

.

•"1 -=~·-----------------

Table 6 · ·
Decay Over Time (Test III) in Drug Knowledge Scores:
Means and Variance Table

N

· · ·Score

E

37

26.57

L

21

28.14

.c

21

.. 27 .10

Group··

Source-of.
Variation

SS

df°

MS

F

Between Groups

33.28

2

16.64

1.55*

Within Groups

816.46

76

10.74

Total

849.74

78

*not significant

Table 7
Percentage of Groups Volunteering for Drug Hot Line*

Group
E

L-

%Volunteering
8

14.8
12.1.

*Control Ss not given an opportunity to
volunteer

Table 8
Relearning Scores for Items R~peated on Test II:
Means and Variance Table

Group·

N

Score

E

54

3.42

L

33

3.76

E+L

87

3.55

... 21

2.43

c
Source of
Variation

SS

df

MS

F

7.92*

Between Groups

23.59

2

11.80

Within Groups

156.41

105

1.49

Total

180.00

107

*p<.01

'

Table 9
Relearning Decay Scores for Items Repeated on Test III:
Means and Variance Table

Group

Score

N

E

36

5.89

L

21

6.43

c

21

.. 5.19

Source of
Variation·

SS

df

MS

F

3.07*

Between Groups

16. 21

2

8.10

Within Groups

195.94

75

2.64

Total

211.15

77

*not significant

I
I
I

l . .,¥_----;~,>"'*-<1-·--·~---. --. --------·N!i-·. .=.......··-·-·!f-llJ__,. .,. . ______..____

II

.,,.l"!li.....

ilrl

Table 10
Effects of Hi and Lo Interest on Subsequent Drug
Knowledge Scores (Tests II & III): Means

Group
Hi Interest
Lo Interest·

Test II

Test III

21.00

26.47

... 26 .86

.. 25.67

Table 11
Interaction Effects of Hi Interest and Hi or Lo
Voluntary Behavior on Drug Knowledge Scores (Test II):
Means

Group·

N

Score

Hi in/ Hi vol Beh

11

28.09

.Hii~/ Lovol .Beh

33 .

18.64

1----------....---------·-·-------·---------·-o..--·-·-·.....,,....,._._..........____..._.......____________________...,,,....,

Table 12
Association between Interest and Concern:
For the Subsample taking all Tests

c

nC

Hi I

30

5

35

Lo I

3

41

44

33

36

x

2
=46.70*, .1 .. df
c

For the Subsample taking Test I & II only
C

nC

lli

Hi r

Lo I

··~

10

29

9
20
2
.
c=l0.73*, 1 df

For both Subsamples Combined
C

nC

Hi I

38

7

45

Lo I

4

59

63

4~

66

x c2;::;:64. .12*,
.
*p .001
*p .01

1 df

Table 13
Association Between Concern (Test II)
and Volunteering for Hot Line*
Vol

non-Vol

3

17

20

30

38

Con

I

noCon

8

11

x2

..

I

~0.043**,

C.

47
.1. df

*Only for E and L Ss taking all three exams;
C Ss not given an opportunity to volunteer
**not significant

-----.. . .

----.-..--~·."."tt111t·~.,~~

lOGctt

·~·---------··~-------.

Table 14
Association between General Voluntary Behavior
and Volunteering for Hot Line*

Vol

non-Vol

H1vol heh

5

9

14

LOvol beh

6

38

44

11

47

2
·•
. Xc=3.22**, 1.af

*Only for E and L Ss taking all three exams;
C Ss not given an opportunity to volunteer
**p<.10

\
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